Saving Investors from Themselves: How Stockholder
Primacy Harms Everyone
Frederick H. Alexander*
We face many tough issues including poverty, climate change, social
and economic inequality, the cost and quality of education and healthcare,
stagnant wages, financial market instability, disease, and food security.
Despite the existential threat that these concerns may raise, there is no
consensus on whether or how to address them through regulation, taxation,
or other government policy tools. Private enterprise, however, has
tremendous potential to address these issues through technology, wages,
supply chain maintenance, green operations, efficient delivery of goods
and services, and a myriad of other outputs and outcomes.
In the U.S., the potential of the private sector to address these issues
dwarfs that of the government. The 2015 federal budget was
approximately $2.5 trillion (excluding transfer payments like Social
Security), while the 2015 gross domestic product (GDP) was about $18
trillion. While numbers go up and down, total government spending
(including state and local) typically accounts for about 20% of GDP when
transfer spending is netted out. Consumer and business spending account
for the other 80%. In light of these realities, harnessing the assets of the
private sector is a critical pathway towards addressing pressing social and
environmental issues.
However, the structure we use to allocate resources in the private
economy actively precludes using assets in this manner. What I want to do
here is describe the structural issue and how a new corporate governance
model—the benefit corporation—can help to restructure our system of
capital allocation. But we require more than a mere adjustment to
corporate governance. I want to suggest that everyone along the
investment chain, from corporate executives and directors to fund
managers and individual investors, add an ethical component to their
decision-making. I do not mean to suggest altruistic investing. What I am
suggesting is that there is a better way to invest for private gain—one that
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will potentially produce a better outcome for all participants in the
economy, including investors. The ethical principle is easy to state:
investors and managers should not seek gains by simply extracting as
much value as possible from the economy, but instead should seek gains
by building and sharing value with all stakeholders in their investments.
In other words, we need to restructure our system to encourage the
investment of private capital in positive sum opportunities.
The current rules for allocating private capital are based on the idea
of “stockholder primacy” and the pursuit of immediate increases to share
value, which have become identified with a pre-governmental pure “free
market.” As Robert Reich points out in his recent book, Saving
Capitalism,1 there is really no such thing. There is no free market without
rules that are created and enforced by government and social mores, and
those rules affect outcomes. The rules in place today pit the interests of
investors against those of other stakeholders rather than linking them. This
is actually a fairly new construct and not a universal one. Pushing the
market in a different direction—one that links the interests of all
stakeholders—will return the U.S. to the model of stakeholder capitalism
that prevailed after World War II. This model would deliberately allocate
capital in order to create value for society as a whole, thereby addressing
critical social and environmental issues. It would return U.S. capitalism to
a system based on making rather than taking.
*

*

*

We have to change the misconception that investors are best served
by managers who attempt to “maximize stockholder value” while being
neutral concerning all other stakeholders affected by their decisions. John
Kay provides a comprehensive description of the mechanisms that allocate
capital in his recent book, Other People’s Money,2 and I have borrowed
his terminology. Kay describes the channels that allocate the savings of
individuals to deposits and investments, which are then used to fund
capital needs, including businesses investment and home mortgages. The
investment channel directs a large portion of these assets into stocks and
bonds, often indirectly through mutual and pension funds, insurance
companies, and other institutions. A large part of that allocation goes to
corporations and other limited liability entities, some publicly traded and
some owned by small groups of investors.
The huge public markets garner most public awareness. For 2015,
the market capitalization of U.S. public companies was more than $26
1. ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW (2016).
2. JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE (2015).
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trillion. That number, however, considerably understates the total value of
the assets that those companies control because they are funded by debt,
as well as equity. (If the markets are working reasonably well, the value
of a corporation’s total assets will roughly equal the aggregate value of its
debt and equity.) As Kay describes, the investment channel serves several
roles critical to a capitalist economy: it finds funding for new long-term
investments, it provides stewardship for funds already invested, and it
allows savers to store and transfer wealth, both within their lifetime and
between generations. These functions are largely performed through
financial intermediaries, including banks, brokers, pension funds,
insurance companies, mutual funds, and other institutions. These
institutions control roughly 70% of the U.S. stock market. In essence, they
“own the economy,” to quote commentators James Hawley and Andrew
Williams.3
Each participant in the chain of investment has an up-the-line
obligation to invest the funds in a manner that has the best balance of risk
and return available. Pension fund managers look to maximize the value
of their beneficiaries’ contributions in order to ensure that pension
obligations will be met and future contributions will be minimized. They
hire investment managers who are charged with earning the best return
they can on a risk-adjusted basis. Those managers in turn select stocks and
expect the directors of the individual companies selected to maximize the
return of the corporations on whose boards they serve. Not only do the
managers select stocks, but they also choose directors and vote on other
matters in order to fulfill their stewardship role. Again, this chain of
investment and stewardship is governed by the upstream obligation of
each manager: the directors have duties to stockholders, and the
investment managers have duties to their beneficiaries, the savers, and the
policyholders who are the ultimate source of the funds. These duties
require that the fiduciaries manage the assets for the benefit of the
investors and not for their own benefit or the benefit of anyone else.
These obligations come from a combination of laws, regulations, and
customs that evolved in response to the growth of large corporations with
many stockholders beginning towards the end of the nineteenth century.
The separation of asset ownership from control of large amounts of assets
created a concern that corporate officers and trustees would use the assets
for their own benefit. This creates a classic agency problem: finding a way
for the investor-principals to monitor the agent-officers without expending
too many resources. Fiduciary duties are one solution we use to address
3. JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 100
(2000).

306

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:303

the agency problem in the investment chain. These duties require
fiduciaries, such as corporate directors, to be careful and loyal but also
give them almost complete discretion to make decisions within those
parameters. In many ways, this model serves us well. There is plenty of
opportunity for the managers to creatively manage capital with the threat
of fiduciary challenges mitigating the risks of misappropriation by agents.
However, with the passage of time, these duties have been strictly
interpreted to require the fiduciary to consider only the interests of the
equity investor. Custom has followed suit, and the role of investment
managers and corporate officers has become generally understood to be
creating value for stockholders. This has created an unintended collateral
effect: the manager that controls the assets must ignore the best interests
of all other stakeholders in the investment enterprise, including workers,
customers, and communities. In today’s capital markets, this doctrine of
“stockholder primacy” pervades the rules that govern the investment
channel from top to bottom. This simple rule may solve the agency
problem, but it creates a huge “stakeholder problem.”
*

*

*

It may help to consider some examples. Mutual funds, public and
private pension funds, and other institutional investors, along with
individuals and others, own Exxon-Mobil, Apple, and General Electric.
These institutions control enough stock to elect the directors. The directors
hire the CEOs. The CEOs make strategic decisions. They decide where to
drill, how to commercialize technologies, how carefully to monitor the
practices of suppliers, and what businesses to acquire or divest. These
decisions have enormous implications for society.
Following fiduciary principles, the asset managers invest in order to
maximize their return, and the company managers in turn steward those
investments to maximize returns to their stockholders. The metric used to
measure this return is stock price and capital return (dividends,
redemptions, and merger payments). And while it might be imagined that
the long-term stock price is more important than the short-term price,
economic theory (in the form of the efficient market hypothesis, which
posits that stock prices reflect all available information) and financial
practice (in the current focus on short-term performance) often measures
stockholder return based on actual stock price rather than hypothetical
future prices.
This dynamic has certainly played out in the current stock market.
There is a great deal of stockholder activism based on raising stock prices
in the immediate term, which often is accomplished by reducing expenses
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to raise earnings, even if those expenses may create value in the long term.
While there are certainly disputes as to whether this is a fair description of
what is happening in some or all activist campaigns, there is no question
that directors are beholden to stockholders through both corporate voting
and fiduciary law. For today’s markets, the strongest indicator of
stockholder return remains the current stock price.
However—and this is a critical point—even if directors try to reject
the short-term model and forgo immediate profits in order to create longer
term value, that value must be for stockholders only. Under prevailing
practice in the U.S., it is not the ultimate purpose of corporations and the
mandate of corporate directors to benefit workers, communities, or
customers—only the stockholders. This trope was famously expressed by
Milton Friedman in 1970 in the New York Times Magazine article titled
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.4 And
although the corporate law of the time may not have endorsed that
statement, today’s corporate law certainly does. Cases decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court in the last two decades of the twentieth century
state very clearly that the sole beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties
are the stockholders.
I want to be clear. This fact does not prevent for-profit corporations
from doing a lot of good or acting for the benefit of the different
stakeholders, as long as those actions in turn benefit its stockholders. And,
of course, treating customers, workers, and the community ethically and
committing to do so can be an excellent strategy for creating stockholder
value, particularly over the long term. Any such commitment, however, is
contingent on the conduct continuing to benefit the stockholders. In
practice, directors generally have very broad discretion under the business
judgment rule to decide when such stakeholder commitments are
beneficial to stockholders, but there must be a connection. Moreover,
when it comes time to sell the company there is no long term for
stockholders. As a result, directors are not allowed to take the interests of
workers, customers, or other stakeholders into account in a sale—they
must simply sell to the highest bidder, and there are dozens of Delaware
corporate cases reinforcing this point.
But is there anything wrong with that? Don’t we want the free market
to find the best use for capital by finding its most profitable use? This
question, however, is based on an assumption that has no factual support:
that high profits to the capital provider is a proxy for the efficient use of
capital. The obvious flaw in that assumption is that capital may be used in
a manner that shifts costs to other stakeholders—creating “negative
4. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine).
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externalities.” Such a use of capital may provide profit to common
stockholders, but a negative return to society (think about a use that
includes a lot of pollution). Relying on stockholder primacy to address
agency costs imposes a different cost: it requires asset managers to play a
negative-sum game with other stakeholders, if that game will give the
investors the greatest return. And, in the “free market” created by
stockholder primacy, each available value-destroying profit opportunity is
pursued until equilibrium is reached.
But, it is not simply bad for the economy overall. In the long run,
stockholder primacy hurts the stockholders themselves. Why? First,
stockholder primacy restricts the ability of corporate managers to employ
strategies of commitment that would actually increase long-term value for
stockholders. Colin Mayer, a finance professor at Oxford University,
explains this phenomenon in the book Firm Commitment.5 Mayer shows
that an entity that employs the share value maximization principle destroys
its own long-term value. He argues that when someone deals with a
corporation bound by stockholder primacy, they know that any
commitment the corporation makes is contingent on either legal
compulsion or continuing value creation for stockholders. This
contingency creates antagonism and legalistic relationships that deter the
creation of durable long-term value with trusted partners. The following
passage from Firm Commitment provides the example of inducing
employees to make valuable commitments when a company cannot
commit back:
If there is an active labour market and it is easy for them to obtain
alternative employment at any time, then it is the firm not the
employees which is exposed. The employees have made no
commitment, whereas it may be costly for the firm to train new
workers every time that an existing one resigns. Now it is the
potential employees who would like to be able to demonstrate
commitment to gain employment but are incapable of doing so on
their own. The firm offers a means of achieving this. It can do it
financially by delaying payment of their wages, thereby making it
costly for them to depart prematurely before the firm has recovered
its investments in training them. Alternatively, it can encourage
commitment by making employment in the firm a valued attribute in
its own regard, reflecting strong employee affinity with the goals and
values of the organization. Critical to both forms of control of firms
over their employees is their corresponding trust in the firm—trust
that the firm will not expropriate their deferred payments by, for
5. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO
RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013).

2017]

Saving Investors from Themselves

309

example, engaging in reckless investments and trust that it really will
uphold the values to which it aspires. That is why the balancing of
commitment and control in the firm is so vital to its successful
operation.6

Unfortunately, any commitment to that better business model is
contingent under stockholder primacy. So when entering into a
relationship with a community or customer, a corporation is unable to
make a deep commitment, a fact that is known to the other party. Lynn
Stout, in her book, the Shareholder Value Myth,7 describes the problem as
a conflict between current (“ex ante”) stockholders and their future (“ex
post”) selves. The ex ante stockholders want the upfront value of
committing, while the ex post stockholders want to get even more value
by defecting:
There is an inevitable conflict between shareholders’ ex ante interest
in “tying their own hands” to encourage their own and other
stakeholders’ firm-specific contributions, and their ex post interest in
opportunistically trying to unbind themselves to unlock capital and
exploit others’ specific contributions. This conflict—a conflict
between shareholders’ ex ante selves and their ex post selves, if you
will—puts public corporations governed by the rules of stockholder
primacy at a disadvantage when it comes to projects that require
firm-specific investments. Rejecting shareholder value thinking, and
instead inviting boards to consider the needs of employees,
customers, and communities, allows boards to usefully mediate not
only between the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, but
between the interests of ex ante and ex post shareholders as well.8

In fairness, I must point out that Professor Stout makes this argument
in support of her argument that stockholder primacy is not the current law;
while I agree wholeheartedly with her policy analysis, I do not believe the
case law supports her. I will discuss these cases later.
Even more critically, stockholder primacy destroys the ability to
build value in other companies. Large institutional owners end up owning
most of the market in order to be sufficiently diversified. Small asset
owners (such as 401(k)s) would be wise to have the same diversification
through the ownership of diversified mutual funds. The returns of such
broad owners (“universal owners”) are reduced when the existing
corporate law regime actively encourages the managers of a huge portion
of our economy to dump negative externalities onto the system in order to
6. Id. at 150–51.
7. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
8. Id. at 85.
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“create value” for their individual companies. For these investors
(including most of the savers atop the investment chain), the most
important factor in the return they receive is not whether they can beat the
market by finding individual companies that outperform—instead, the
most important factor is how the market performs. It is estimated that
general market performance (“beta”) contributes about 80% to a
diversified portfolio’s performance while particular choices (“alpha”)
contributes only 20%. Companies that create systemic risks and costs are
likely to damage the market in its entirety. This is precisely what the
financial sector did by chasing individual returns in the mortgage market,
leading to the financial crisis, which hurt the stockholders of all
companies, to say nothing of the dislocation and costs suffered by
homeowners.
These two points—the value of commitment in a single corporation
and the importance of universal ownership—are closely linked. The
creation of value through commitment to stakeholders highlights a critical
distinction in methods for creating stockholder value. One way is simply
to obtain as much profit as legally possible, whether that profit comes from
creating value in the world or from simply extracting value from other
stakeholders. Thus, a company guided by stockholder primacy might
switch to a cheaper fuel that increases its carbon footprint in order to
increase its profits. However, that company has not really created
value—it has just taken value from everyone else (by increasing climate
risk) in order to achieve a short-term profit. In contrast, a company that
practices stakeholder values would be more likely to save money by
increasing efficiency and lowering its carbon footprint. Furthermore, a
company that could commit to internally accounting for carbon costs is
more likely to earn the trust of communities, consumers, and workers,
thereby creating shared, real value.
Thus, the shared, real value created for a company through
stakeholder commitments is much better for a universal owner because
that value is more likely to benefit its entire portfolio. In contrast, investing
in a corporation that might maximize its own value by exporting negative
externalities is a losing game for diversified investors, as well as for the
system as a whole. So universal investors should, as a general rule, prefer
holistic value maximizers, not chasers of individual advantage. But it is
not just about portfolios. Savers also care about the world they live in. The
practice of stakeholder values will contribute to the value of the other
forms of capital that savers depend on—their own human capital, the
natural capital of our planet, and the social capital of a peaceful and just
society. Stockholder primacy requires companies to ignore these crucial
forms of capital that we all rely on.
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Common sense tells us that investors should want corporations to be
able to pursue these value-maximizing strategies, but the current
investment paradigm precludes it. The system through which we allocate
most of our productive capital actively encourages businesses to “create
stockholder value” by heaping costs and risks onto the system—onto their
own owners—in preference to actually building value. This benefits no
one, except short-term players who siphon value from the rest of the
economy.
How did we get to this irrational place? Stockholder primacy is a
relatively recent development. Although stockholder primacy as a means
of addressing the agency problem was debated for much of the late
twentieth century, the prevailing sentiment appeared to lean toward
stakeholder, not stockholder principles. In 1951, the chairman of Standard
Oil could describe corporate managers with no thought of stockholder
primacy: “The job of management is to maintain an equitable and working
balance among the claims of various directly affected interest
groups . . . stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.”9
No hedge fund manager would be satisfied if the chairman of
Exxon-Mobil were to take such a position today, but the view prevailed
during the years of post-war prosperity to the great benefit of anyone
broadly invested in the U.S. economy. Reich describes the change as
follows:
In fact, in the first three decades following World War II . . . . [t]he
large corporation was in effect “owned” by everyone with a stake in
how it performed. The notion that only shareholders count emerged
from a period in the 1980s when corporate raiders demanded [that]
managers sell off “underperforming” assets, close factories, take on
more debt, and fire employees in order to maximize shareholder
returns.10

The story of stockholder primacy’s ascendance is complex. It
involves the collapse of the postwar monetary agreements, the
globalization of the capital markets, and the influence of economic theory
typified by Milton Friedman, but also championed by the law and
economics movement. But the Delaware courts provided the capstone for
the model of stockholder primacy with a series of decisions in the 1980s.
These cases held that corporations exist primarily to generate
stockholder value. Accordingly, the nation’s most important corporate law
jurisdiction viewed the maximization of stockholder wealth as the primary
indicator of whether directors are complying with their fiduciary duties. In
9. Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21.
10. REICH, supra note 1, at 18.
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1985, when Revlon tried to defend itself against a hostile takeover by Ron
Perlman, arguing that the takeover would hurt bondholders, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that directors owe their duties to stockholders only.
Further, because the directors had decided to sell the company, there was
no “long run” for the stockholders. Therefore, immediate stockholder
wealth maximization had to be the sole objective for directors, even if
Perlman’s high bid might destroy large amounts of bondholder value (or,
by extension, worker or community value). In his academic writings, the
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a reading of the
Delaware case law consistent with the stockholder primacy model and has
summarized it with the following proposition: “[T]he object of the
corporation is to produce profits for the stockholders and . . . social beliefs
of the managers, no more than their own financial interests, cannot be their
end in managing the corporation.”11
As a result of these developments, our capital is now allocated to
work against our interests. In a chapter written for the Cambridge
Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, Raj
Thamotheram and Aidan Ward provide a chilling example of how this
thinking leads companies to act in a manner that hurts all investors:
What is the price of a bee? And more generally, where does the
extinction of bee populations—and with bees much of agriculture as
we know it—fit into discounted cash flow and other investment/risk
decision-making tools? The simple answer is that they don’t.
To summarize, the scientific case that one class of pesticides,
neonicotinoids, are particularly dangerous to bees is now very clear
(Maxim and van der Sluijs 2013). . . . [T]he biggest producers of
these chemicals . . . have also played leading roles in the powerful
industry push back against regulatory action. Already too late, the
industry has persuaded some supportive governments to back further
delay (Jolly 2013). . . . [T]he role of investors is very important but
hidden. Investors incentivize corporate management to worry (much)
more about shareholder returns than helping to cause a form of
ecocide that could be economically disastrous for asset owners and
their members. In addition, investors show no real stewardship
activity to counterbalance the effect of company management who
use shareholder money to lobby for what is not in the real interests of
the end-beneficiaries.12

11. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151 (2012).
12. Raj Thamotheram & Aidan Ward, Whose Risk Counts?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 207, 211 (James P. Hawley et al. eds., 2014).
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This stockholder primacy model was the structure under which I
practiced law for twenty-six years. As a partner at a Delaware law firm, I
worked on preferred stock financings, IPOs, mergers, hostile takeovers,
proxy contests, corporate governance, and fiduciary issues. My practice
was based on some fairly simple rules and principles. Directors are elected
by stockholders and have the full authority to manage the corporation once
elected, but must do so prudently and unselfishly to create a financial
return for stockholders.
That basic structure—stockholder-elected directors manage the
corporation, but must do so carefully and loyally for the financial benefit
of the stockholders—underlies nearly every question that comes up in
corporate law disputes. The stockholder primacy paradigm drove much of
the advice I gave to clients. While corporations could certainly be good
employers and valuable resources to the community, that was not their
raison d’etre—corporate law was about creating value for the
stockholders, who owned the corporation and elected its managers to
oversee their investment. For corporate lawyers, these are simple,
nonideological facts. They view the corporate form as a brilliant legal
technology that allows entities to raise large sums of money from
disaggregated investors, who can diversify their investments across many
entities, allowing corporations to take risks and create value. The
underlying ethos is that investors are willing to risk their capital with
complete strangers because they know that there is a system in place to
protect them: elected directors who are obligated to be loyal to
stockholders. Agency problem solved.
A few years ago, when I was chairing the Delaware Bar committee
(the Council) that recommends changes to the Delaware General
Corporation Law, we were approached by B Lab, a nonprofit organization
that works to make business a force for good. Among other projects, B
Lab certifies companies as being good corporate citizens (like a Fair Trade
mark for corporations). B Lab has two requirements for
certification—first, the company must meet a strict standard of social and
environmental performance; second, the company must have a corporate
governance model that mandates good corporate citizenship. For
corporations, however, that second aspect violates the stockholder
primacy model central to traditional corporate law. Thus, B Lab was
lobbying state legislatures to adopt a statute they had drafted called the
Model Benefit Corporation Law (MBCL). The MBCL contains a number
of provisions that require corporations to follow a stakeholder model.
When a state adopts the MBCL or similar statutory provisions,
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corporations created under that state’s general corporation law can opt into
the new provisions and become “benefit corporations.”
In Delaware, our reaction to B Lab’s proposal was far from positive.
The corporate bar was very comfortable with the way that corporate law
worked and cognizant of the tremendous value the corporate form had
produced over time. Even progressive corporate lawyers, who believed
that corporate behavior with respect to social and environmental issues
was problematic, did not think those issues should be addressed by
changing corporate law. Instead, there was consensus that those issues
could be better addressed with laws and regulations that protected society
and the environment—better to allow the free market for capital to work
its magic, find the most profitable (and therefore most productive) use, and
let the government regulate any bad behavior.
However, the Council was encouraged by the Governor and the
Secretary of State to undertake a review of the concept, particularly in light
of Delaware’s national leadership in corporate law and the growing
interest in the benefit corporation movement. With the assistance of B Lab,
members of the Council met with entrepreneurs and investors who
championed the concept. As a result of this process, the Council
determined that Delaware ought to offer businesses the ability to operate
in the form of a benefit corporation. In 2013, Delaware adopted a statute
allowing corporations to opt in to a structure where the duties of directors
extend beyond stockholders to include all stakeholders. I was personally
convinced and became one of the drafters of the Delaware’s benefit
corporation statute, eventually giving up my partnership. I am now Head
of Legal Policy at B Lab.
*

*

*

Benefit corporation legislation has now been adopted in thirty-two
U.S. jurisdictions, as well as Italy, and is being considered elsewhere.
There are approximately 4,500 benefit entities (a few states authorize
benefit LLCs, in addition to corporations) in the U.S. For the most part,
these entities are small companies without significant outside investment.
There are, however, a significant number that have raised money from
venture capital funds and other professional investors. These investors
include some of the most well-known venture investors—Founders Fund,
Benchmark Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, and Union Square Ventures.
Some of these companies are doing quite well and will be candidates for
IPOs in the not-too-distant future. One KKR-backed company, Laureate
Education, has already filed its registration with the SEC in anticipation of
going public. Laureate is a massive for-profit higher education company
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with more than $4 billion in annual revenue and campuses in twenty-eight
countries.
We are, then, at an inflection point. State legislatures, including
Delaware, have created a new path for the investment channel to
follow—the $26 trillion in public company equity capital can, through
IPOs and conversions of traditional companies, begin to be applied to
enterprises that work to build value for all stakeholders. Whether this will
happen is a critical question and a policy debate we ought to be having.
Most public companies are currently required to measure their success by
one metric: stockholder value. There is no room under the stockholder
primacy model for a corporation to credibly commit to long-term social
and environmental responsibility, even if doing so could potentially
produce value for the corporation on a risk adjusted basis and that behavior
would overall benefit its investors because of their diversity of interests.
Yet tens of trillions of dollars of our economy are controlled under this
counterproductive construct. As a society, we would clearly be better off
if some or all of this capital was deployed under benefit corporation
principles, so that directors could choose the path that was best for all
stakeholders—or could at least consider all stakeholders in the mix.
The policy question is whether the introduction of benefit
corporation law, by giving corporations an opportunity to reject
stockholder primacy, is sufficient to address our current issues of capital
allocation. The model is optional, and investment managers must be
convinced that investing in stakeholder values will satisfy their duties to
their beneficiaries. Remember that I earlier referred to two levels of
fiduciary relationships: director to stockholders and asset managers to
beneficiaries. The stockholder value model infects both the latter and
former. Asset managers compete on the basis of short-term returns. This
is understandable. Current and past financial performance seems like the
only reliable financial metric available. Moreover, the efficient market
hypothesis, which posits that stock price reflects all available information,
provides intellectual support for such a metric. However, even if current
stock prices were a valid indicator of company performance, it is important
to emphasize that this is an irredeemably flawed measuring stick for
diversified investors because it ignores the effect of company performance
on portfolio performance.
We have to change both investing concepts and the understanding of
fiduciary law as applied to investment fiduciaries. Briefly, the problem is
that Modern Portfolio Theory is still the dominant investing theory and
managers follow it because they believe that following the dominant
theory protects them from liability. In his article, The Time Has Come for
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a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in Investment,13 Jay Youngdahl
makes this point in clear language: “[L]awyers tell trustees that the trustees
will be sued and ‘lose their house’ if they deviate from the Wall Street
model.”14 This is exactly the line that I have heard from pension fund staff.
Youngdahl goes on to quote Steve Lyndberg of Domini Social
Investments as to the damage done by contemporary investment models:
[T]he dominant theory of investing today, Modern Portfolio Theory,
is based on a definition of success that fails to acknowledge the extent
to which investments at the portfolio level can affect the overall
financial markets . . . . [T]he benefits that accrue from the practice of
this theory are at best part of a zero-sum game and available to only
a limited number of investors.15

The law and theory are aggravated by the fact that asset managers
are compensated based on “beating the market,” or at least not trailing it,
so that they are forced to take this short-term approach of investing in
companies that increase share price by assaulting the system. We need to
stop compensating asset managers in this fashion. We need to make sure
that the fiduciary rules that govern asset managers are clear about this. And
we need investor fiduciaries to start thinking like benefit corporation
directors.
* * *
The good news is that there is every reason to think that the ultimate
capital providers—you and I, through our pensions, 401(k) plans,
insurance policies, and other investments—have the right incentive to
insist on a model where investment managers take a long-term, broader
market view of their obligations. We want the market to rise long-term so
we can pay for college, fund retirement, and retain the wealth we have
built for our children or others. Moreover, we want a peaceful, vibrant, and
thriving society located on a healthy planet. These desires all counsel that
we look for investments that build shared and durable value, rather than
chase short-term gains and impose negative externalities.
Many individuals in the investment community understand these
concerns. Principles for Responsible Investment,16 a sustainability
initiative affiliated with the United Nations, now has signatories
worldwide with $59 trillion under management. The initiative
13. Jay Youngdahl, The Time Has Come for a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in
Investment, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115 (2011).
14. Id. at 117.
15. Id. at 125.
16. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, https://www.unpri.org/ [https://perma.cc/
5RNZ-USU9].
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promulgates six principles intended to lead investment fiduciaries to
integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into their
investment strategies. The organization describes its commitment as
follows:
As institutional investors, we have a duty to act in the best long-term
interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary role, we believe that
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can
affect the performance of investment portfolios . . . . We also
recogni[z]e that applying these Principles may better align investors
with broader objectives of society.17

Forward-looking asset managers, like CalPERS,18 which manages
$300 billion of pension assets for California’s public employees,
understand the issue, as illustrated by a statement from their investment
beliefs: “As a long-term investor, CalPERS must consider risk factors, for
example climate change and natural resource availability, that emerge
slowly over long time periods but could have a material impact on
company or portfolio returns.”19
Hermes Investment Management, a well-known U.K. pension
advisor, is very clear about the broad concern of universal owners and the
unsustainability of negative-sum strategies:
Most investors are widely diversified; therefore it makes little sense
for them to support activity by one company which is damaging to
overall economic activity. . . . [I]t makes little sense for pension
funds to support commercial activity which creates an equal or
greater cost to society by robbing Peter to pay Paul.20

In addition, recent guidance from the Department of Labor has made
it easier for private pension plans to include ESG factors into their
investment models, and some interpret the advice as allowing such plans
to consider the effect of the investments on pensioners’ quality of life
beyond the health of the plan. In another intriguing development, the
influential Robert Eccles and Tim Youmans of Harvard Business School
have embarked on a project to collect statements worldwide from boards
17. The Six Principles, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, https://www.unpri.org/
about/the-six-principles [https://perma.cc/Y7JD-MUKN].
18. CalPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/ [https://perma.cc/GGR2-TEKK].
19. CalPERS, Our Views Guiding Us into the Future 10 (May 2015),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/calpers-beliefs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3UKHLT7].
20. HERMES INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, THE HERMES RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES
10, https://www.vontobel.com/CH/Download?Source=AssetStore&Id=5b649e02-d18a-4834-ab6f828f79016768&Filename=The_Hermes_Ownership_Principles_EU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PVBZJKN].
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of directors to identify the stakeholders material to the corporation, what
their interests are, and how the board weights them. The project is
conceived as a direct response to the prevailing ideology of stockholder
primacy.
Despite these positive developments, investment and corporate
practice are still overwhelmingly dominated by the short-term, individual
company perspective. Just read any financial publication or watch a
business news channel. Even asset managers that sign on to PRI principles
continue to compensate their portfolio managers on short-term, alpha
metrics. Moreover, while the movement toward corporate social
responsibility is admirably growing, this movement often seems to
emphasize the direct value that individual companies achieve through
responsible and sustainable practices—money saved through green
initiatives, improved employee performance resulting from enlightened
employment practice, etc. There is a palpable fear about openly
committing to sharing value with other stakeholders; it just seems
unbusinesslike. But, as I have tried to show, there are entirely sound
reasons from the investor perspective for incorporating stakeholder values,
whether it is increasing stock value by permitting real stakeholder
commitment, increasing portfolio value by decreasing systemic costs, or
improving the lives of beneficiaries by preserving the environment. We
should not be embarrassed that doing the right thing creates value.
But, perhaps this all sounds a bit pat. Can investors really improve
the lives of others with no sacrifice? What are the trade-offs? It is too easy
to just assume that increased value for investors and stakeholders always
converge, correct? Well, no and yes. No, for the reasons already addressed.
By moving toward stakeholder values, the investment channel allocates
assets to uses that create more value overall. By taking negative-sum
opportunities off the table, the stakeholder model creates more aggregate
value for stakeholders and stockholders to share. Thus, we should expect
that eliminating stockholder primacy can enhance value for all parties,
thereby solving the “stakeholder problem.” It is just math.
But in one very significant way, consistent application of stakeholder
values will take away a profit opportunity for investors—the opportunity
to free ride. In a world where most of our capital is being invested in a
responsible and sustainable manner, all investors would benefit from the
good behavior. In such a world, there would continue to be opportunities
to create value in the negative-sum way, because a bit of pollution or one
lousy supply chain is not likely to greatly affect the market or portfolios
of the investors. So, corporate management may be tempted to “cheat.”
Investment managers may be tempted to seek out the cheaters so they can
free ride on the beta updraft while getting a little extra alpha for

2017]

Saving Investors from Themselves

319

themselves. Each individual investor may feel that its best strategy is to
look for extractive value, whether or not most investors do so. And, as long
as our investment rules permit such activity, there is a real concern that
profit seekers will feel constrained by competitive pressure to seek out
these opportunities until equilibrium is reached, taking us back to
stockholder primacy.
As I noted at the beginning, 80% of our capital assets are allocated
through the investment channel and subject to this dilemma. Our public
policy discussions focus on the government’s role in addressing social
issues, but the government only allocates 20% of our capital. We must
have a public discussion that allows us to establish ethical investment
principles enforced by laws and custom. Benefit corporation law is an
excellent start, but much more needs to be done. I have addressed a number
of opportunities that stockholder primacy denies to savers including the
building of value based on genuine trust and commitment; the
rationalization of broad portfolios so that their components are not wasting
resources in a negative-sum game; and a portfolio that makes a positive
contribution to all aspects of savers’ lives, not just their bank accounts.
An honest appraisal of these opportunities has to recognize that they
exist on a spectrum, not in discrete categories, and that there is not even
strict separation between these opportunities and the sorts of goodwill and
reputational value available to conventional corporations and investors
today. At the same time, public policy influencers must recognize that one
key concept underlies all of these opportunities: the shared benefits of
driving capital to build positive value for all stakeholders. The best way to
navigate this admittedly fuzzy landscape is to adopt a set of rules,
including fiduciary law all the way up the investment chain that
acknowledges that all stakeholders matter. It is simply too hard—and too
dangerous—to determine when selfish negative-sum behavior might be
better for the stockholders of a single corporation. By replacing
stockholder primacy with stakeholder values up and down the investment
chain, we can minimize the “costs” to stockholders of addressing the
stakeholder problem. This rule will efficiently push us towards the correct
side of the spectrum and also address the free rider problem.
This brings us to the ethical principle stated at the beginning:
investors and managers should not seek gains by simply extracting as
much value as possible from the economy, but should instead seek gains
by simply building and sharing value with all stakeholders in their
investments. There must be a commitment at the investor level, similar to
the management level in a benefit corporation, to seek out stock value only
by building real value. Investors and market participants that play by
different rules need to be shunned and shamed. Integrating this ethic into
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the financial system is a beginning, not an end. Corporate and investment
managers, as well as investors themselves, will have to do the hard work
of figuring out where the value enhancing opportunities are, even though
there will be disagreement on the importance and weight of various
stakeholder interests. But, in order to at least get all that capital working
in the right direction, we have to change the basic rules. Companies and
investors must stop competing to take and start competing to create.

